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BOOK REVIEWS
STANDARD FAMILY COURT ACT
5 National Probation and Parole Assoc.
Journal No. 2 (1959)
Reviewed by
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG*
"Not this Man but Barabbas." The cry
has re-echoed for two thousand years. De-
spite the vastness of their empires and their
billions in gold, the followers of Barabbas
are frank failures in the management of
marriage and its consequences. The most
Barabbasque of modern nations has con-
fessed failure in its experiment to abolish
forthwith the family structure. Other na-
tions, marked for their material advance-
ment, have experienced a decrease of family
ties almost in direct ratio to increase of
national income. In Great Britain, divorces
and separations increased from 500 to
50,000 per year in the first half of the
twentieth century. In the United States,
while national income was increasing
almost a third between 1948 and 1955,
juvenile court cases increased more than
two-thirds. This Man raised marriage alone
among all human transactions to the divine
dignity of a Sacrament. No nation has been
sane enough to follow His way. The patch-
work of poultices provided by human laws
has failed to save marriage. How can nat-
*Member of the New York Bar.
uralistic remedies alone eliminate evils that
arise directly from ignoring the supernatural
nature of marriage?
A family court structure, ideally con-
ceived by naturalistic standards,. may not
succeed in saving marriage; it can alleviate
abuses arising from overlapping and frag-
mentation of court jurisdiction over family
problems. To take an extreme example,
there are as many as thirty-eight different
courts and parts of courts that may have
to be resorted to in order to provide a legal
solution to the related difficulties of a sin-
gle family in the City of New York. A wife
may have her husband brought before the
district Magistrate's Court for a perennial
problem euphemistically labelled "family
'fight." If a-ilow was struck, the husband
may have to face trial in another court,
Special Sessions, before three justices. If
the wife complains also of non-support, she
can be aided neither by the Magistrate's,
nor Special Sessions courts. Still another
court, the Domestic Relations, Family Part,
will have to be resorted to. If the suggested
solution is a permanent separation, she
must go to the Supreme Court, where the
usual requirement of retaining counsel
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might well make this proceeding unavail-
able to the poor. If the son of this unfor-
tunate union comes into conflict with the
law, the jurisdiction of any one of a dozen
courts, or their parts, may- be invoked. If
the conflict is a criminal one not involving
the penalty of death or life imprisonment,
then the Children's Court part of the Do-
mestic Relations Court will have exclusive
jurisdiction if the youngster is under sixteen
at the time of committing the offense. If
the youth is over sixteen at the time of
commission, but has not yet reached his
nineteenth birthday, then the court having
jurisdiction may depend upon the part of
the city in which the offense was committed.
If in Brooklyn, Queens, or Richmond, the
matter may be brought to the Adolescents'
Court, a part of the Magistrate's Court, or
in other parts of the city to the Youth Part
of the Court of Special Sessions. If this
youth has committed an offense of the
grade of felony, then he is subject to the
Youth Part of the Court of General Ses-
sions, if the offense was committed in Man-
hattan, or to a similar part of the County
Court, if committed in other parts of the
city. If the daughter of this hapless couple
gives birth to a child out of wedlock, then
the court having jurisdiction to determine
paternity and support would be that of
Special Sessions.
A sound court system ought to provide
a just method of dispute-settling so as to
avoid resort to self-help. That method
should also be convenient and expeditious.
A litigant should not be required to run
the risk of going to the wrong court; or, if
he has gone to the right court, to learn that
it can only dispose of a small segment of
the entire controversy. The proposed Stand-
ard Family Court Act certainly meets this
shortcoming in resolving family disputes.
The Act is the work of committees of law-
yers and social workers representing three
major groups concerned with families in
conflict with the law: the NPPA, the Chil-
dren's Bureau, and the Council of Juvenile
Court Judges. It represents the maximum
that a social worker might demand of a
Family Court, and at the same time offers
the careful draftsmanship of bold-faced
statutory text and explanatory comment
that would satisfy a committee of the Amer-
ican Law Institute. The Act sets up a uni-
fied tribunal with power over virtually every
family difficulty involving the law. Children
under eighteen would be subject to this
court, not only in proceedings for delin-
quency and neglect, but also for custody
and support, even when arising out of
matrimonial actions. Adoption and pa-
ternity proceedings would be vested in
this court. Adults would also be subject to
the court's jurisdiction in all of these pro-
ceedings. In addition, the court would have
control over adults for all crimes com-
mitted against their children, crimes less
than felonies committed against any chil-
dren, and commitment in lunacy proceed-
ings. Finally, the proposed Act gives the
Family Court jurisdiction over divorce, an-
nulment, separation, and matters of sup-
port and custody incidental thereto.
One defect of the proposed Act is that
it would stretch the span of specialization
of its judges beyond the breaking point.
Early American state court systems were
based on Coke's idea, expressed in his
Fourth Institute, of a series of specialized
courts. The New York system, dating from
1846, embodies this notion. Such speciali-
zation of courts produces conflicts of
jurisdiction with the consequence of con-
centration on these abstruse questions at
the expense of those relating to the merits
of the case. When meritorious contro-
versies are thrown out on jurisdictional
grounds, they must be relitigated. This
wastes the time, money, effort, and in-
genuity of court, counsel, litigants, and
witnesses. A series of fragmentary dispo-
sitions of a single, entire controversy may
produce a result considerably at variance
with one disposition by a unified tribunal.
And separate courts dealing with a single
dispute may cause successive appeals that
unnecessarily burden appellate courts. The
superior system, suggested by equity juris-
prudence, would be a unified tribunal
staffed with specialist judges.
It is this superior principle that is
strained by the proposed Act. A district
judge sitting in the proposed Family Court
may have special talent for resolving cases
of delinquent and neglected children in
which issues of fact seldom arise, procedure
is informal, and counsel almost never ap-
pear. Does such skill suggest the tempera-
ment and training necessary for the conduct
of the trial before jury of a felony indict-
ment against an adult? Does it imply special
ability to deal with the involved issues of
law that may arise out of a matrimonial
action and that can be resolved only after
consideration of competing principles of
private international law that are pressed
by carefully prepared counsel? Aptitude for
settling family fights might well be corre-
lated with the proposed duty of the Family
Court judge to supervise marriage counsel-
ling attached to his court. But there is no
reason to suppose that such a judge would
be expert in ruling upon the admissibility
of evidence and in summing up to a jury.
In insisting that so many different sorts of
duties be assumed by a single judge, there
is serious risk that the weighty interest in
maintaining the integrated viewpoint of
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the family might be overbalanced by the
equally weighty interest in having a judge
and tribunal specially adapted to the de-
mands of a particular case.
Perhaps this objection could be over-
come by vesting some of the jurisdiction
of the proposed Family Court concurrently
rather than exclusively. The Judicial Con-
ference of the State of New York, sym-
pathetic to the idea of a unified Family
Court, proposed in 1958 such a court
without jurisdiction over trial of felonies
before juries, or over matrimonial actions.
This might well be an acceptable first step
in striking a balance between the interest
in a specialist judge and that of -providing
unified service for an integrated problem.
The proposed Act also would have the
judges on the Family Court rank with those
of the highest state tribunal with trial juris-
diction. This poses an acute political prob-
lem in most states. Objectively, there is
no sound reason why the disposition of
family problems ought not to enjoy the
same prestige as the disposition of mone-
tary disputes. But in insisting that the
proposed Family Court have power to
mandate its budget from the Legislature,
the proponents of the Act go beyond the
necessities of maintaining the independence
of the judiciary. Such provisions may be
justifiable in special situations, such as that
of the Supreme Court within the City of
New York when almost a third of the liti-.
gation in that court involves the munici-
pality and there is danger of budgetary
reprisal for adverse decisions. No such
situation would be conceivable in a Family
Court. Such power to mandate a budget
would indeed invade the province of the
Legislature to apportion funds available for
family purposes among various agencies,
judicial and non-judicial.
